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The Natural and Probable Consequences
Doctrine: A Case Study in Failed Law
Reform
Michael G. Heymant
INTRODUCTION
Academics hate bad law. Filling the pages of journals such as
this, we explore ways to improve the law. Standing before our classes,
we seek to cultivate the critical faculties of our students, encouraging
them to avoid blindly accepting poor reasoning and facile ideas.
Outside of the academy, we pursue projects to create more effective
and just laws. We laud events such as the appearance of the Model
Penal Code.' Indeed, our fondness for law reform is so great that we
even celebrate "anniversaries," as with the upcoming fiftiethanniversary of the Code. 2
In all this, we expect the law's progress, if labored, toward
greater rationality and coherence. But is that right? Writing at the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Code, Paul Robinson posited two
possible courses that post-Code law could follow. 3 By one view,
"guided and spurred on by academics," existing irrationalities and
misconceived modifications would recede, as judges and legislatures
became more familiar with Code law. 4
Unfortunately, it seemed equally likely that "legislatures
[would] continue in their misguided revisions for the political value
that such activity can provide." 5 Though not fully subscribing to one
view or the other, this article will nevertheless examine a misguided

t

Professor, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago.

I MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (Part 1: General
Provisions); MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft and Revised Comment 1980) (Part

II: Definition of Specific Crimes).
2 See, e.g, Symposium: The 25th Anniversary of the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 519 (1988).
3 Paul H. Robinson, Four Predictions for the Crininal Law of2043, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 897 (1988).
4 Id. at 907.
Id.
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revision of Illinois's natural and probable consequences doctrine and
the extraordinary dynamic that led the Illinois courts and legislature to
resurrect notions long thought by many to have been properly laid to
rest. Thus, though the focus is on the activities in one state, this article
is simply a case study in how various forces interact in the legal
process of law reform. The subject matter is familiar nationally as are,
unfortunately, the forces that led Illinois to codify its take on the
notion that accomplices are liable for the "natural and probable"
crimes committed by the primary actors.
I will look at several topics to make some sense of these
developments. First, I will examine theories of accomplice liability
and the fit of liability for natural and probable crimes within that
framework. Next, I will examine the anomaly of that doctrine within a
scheme based on the Model Penal Code. Since I am not alone in
noticing this problem, I will also examine the work product of the two
commissions most recently at work on these issues and the odd
relationship between the courts and legislature in the development of
the law. Finally, I will focus on the real-world consequences of recent
misguided efforts from the perspective of the victims: those wrongly
convicted because of this politically cavalier lawmaking.
I. RATIONALES FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND THE
NATURAL AND PROBABLE DOCTRINE
Accomplice accountability is one of the most difficult topics to
deal with properly, either pedagogically or through scholarly analysis.
When people are part of multi-crime enterprises, it seems
counterintuitive both for someone to be liable for the conduct of
another and for her not to be. We feel people should accept
responsibility for what they do and only for that, yet we also feel they
should not so easily dissociate themselves from the wrongs of their
associates. However, it is pointless to discuss the subset of accomplice
accountability without first examining the larger concept.
The Model Penal Code, most generally, bases accountability on
one's personal association with a criminal venture. 6 So long as
someone has in some way participated (even ineffectually) in a crime
with the intent to further the target crime, she is liable as if she had
perpetrated the offense personally. But it was not always this way.

6 See

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.06 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
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A. Parties and Punishment
The Code drafters confronted a baroque maze of concepts and
characters as they faced the task of law reform. First, the common law
had created two categories of participants to multi-party crimes:
principals and accessories ? In turn, each category was further subdivided into groups, generally based on either temporal or spatial
features.
The most familiar participant was the "principal in the first
degree," most commonly thought of as the perpetrator. She both had
the mental state for the crime and directly satisfied the act requirement,
either personally or through another whom she manipulated. 8 Though
we intuitively believe that she is most deserving of punishment, that
notion is sometimes misguided.
The second member is the so-called "principal in the second
degree." That designation signifies some level of attenuation, as she
need not be physically present for guilt to attach. Constructive
presence will do. Moreover, she does not commit the actus reus of the
offense but is guilty because of the assistance she has provided in the
commission of the offense. Often, the assistance may consist of being
a lookout, getaway driver, or the like. The potential forms of
assistance are virtually limitless.
The next two types of actors vary from the principal in terms of
their location or the timing of their assistance. The "accessory before
the fact" by definition is not present, either constructively or actually,
at the time of the commission of the crime. Rather, he has in some
manner encouraged the principal in the first degree to commit the
offense. Again, rather counter-intuitively, he could be the mastennind
for the crime yet is frequently thought of as somewhat less
blameworthy because of the spatial-temporal separation from the
offense.
Finally, in the "accessory after the fact" we have an actor who
simply tried to shield the main actors from detection. Oddly, she was
still derivatively liable for the original crime, despite her late entrance

For a fuller development of this, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 468 (5th ed. 2009).
Each discussion is based on DRESSLER, supra note 7. In this case, manipulation
means that she used another to commit the act, often as a kind of innocent
instrumentality.
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upon the scene. Fortunately, nearly all jurisdictions now treat such
conduct as a separate crime, one less serious than the original one.9
The Model Penal Code saw little utility in these distinctions.
Breaking dramatically with prior law, the Code jettisoned the formerly
vague notions of the bases for accountability, anchoring the statute in
the now-familiar Code pattern of clearly defined acts and mental
states. Indeed, the 1961 comments to the Illinois Code, which
included many provisions of the Model Penal Code, "observed that
liability under this subsection requires proof of an 'intent to promote
or facilitate . . . commission" of the substantive offense."' 0

But in rejecting these common law distinctions, the Model
Penal Code and those jurisdictions that follow it also take a monolithic
approach to derivative liability. So long as someone satisfies its
culpability requirements, she is accountable for the conduct of others.
It does not matter whether she effectively contributed to the crime, nor
does it matter how trivial the assistance.
Moreover, once
accountability is established, guilt does not vary as between the
primary actor and secondary parties. They are equally guilty, fit to be
punished identically.
Professor George Fletcher has quite rightly lamented this
heavy-handed approach, contrasting the American position most
notably with that of Germany and countries influenced by Germanic
jurisprudence.
Whereas all participants are treated monolithically in
America, Fletcher noted the differentiated participation in criminal law
systems elsewhere, especially that of Germany.
The American and German schemes of criminal liability share
many similarities.12 However, they also part ways in many areas, the
greatest difference lying in a fundamental dimensional difference:
whereas American law, especially in the common law era, focused on
the temporal perspective when the conduct took place-liability
under German law turns on the presence or degree of Tatherrschaftact dominion. Employing that notion, German law generated an
approach that reflected "gradations in personal culpability among

9

Id. at 471.

10See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2 cint. (West 1993).
" GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 467 (1978) (critiquing the failure

to recognize criminal law "as a body of ideas and practices with a reality deeper than
the positive prescriptions of courts and legislatures").
12 Markus D. Dubber, CriminalizingComplicity: A ComparativeAnalysis, 5 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 977, 985-987 (2007).
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various parties in crime."
And, consistent with that, German law
also generated gradations of punishment, presumably consistent with
the actor's controlled participation in the criminal enterprise.14
American law, whether guided by the Code or common law,
treats principals and accessories identically. However, "the German
Criminal Code draws a sharp line between the punishment of
principals and solicitors on the one hand, and facilitators on the
other." 15
Whereas facilitators receive the benefit of mitigated
sentences, solicitors are punished the same as principals. The theory
of the Tatherrrschaft generated gradations in personal culpability
based both on the extent to which the offense was the product of the
actor's "event directing will" and his dominance over the commission
of the act in terms of causal contribution. 17 In turn, that was reflected
in the sentencing scheme.' 8
B. Why Do We Punish the Non-perpetrator?
Intuitively, the German Code establishes a sensible relationship
between parties and punishment. Something in us agrees that
culpability varies based on one's level of participation and that the
level of punishment should be somehow commensurate.
Unfortunately, that intuition does not yield a complete theory of
accountability and punishment. Neither, however, do the reigning
models in America.
Lost in detailed discussion' 9 of the act and mental state
adequate for accomplice liability is any recognition of the confused
theory or theories supporting that liability in the first place. As I have
said, we simultaneously embrace the notions of individual liability and
joint liability based on association with a multi-party criminal
enterprise. That cannot be.

Id. at 7.

See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I
[BGBl. I] §§ 25-27. These and other references to the German Code can be found at
http:/'dejure.org/gesetze/StGB/. That service also links to translations of the Code.
1 Dubber, supra note 12, at 984.
16 StGB section 49 covers this in great
detail.
1 Dubber, supra note 12,
at 983.
SSee StGB § 25-27; see also StGB § 29.
'9 Some of this detailed discussion follows in sections of this article.
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Professor Joshua Dressler has examined these odd, conflicting
views underlying accomplice liability. 20 Recognizing the dominance
of the moral forfeiture and agency theories as supports for accomplice
liability, Dressler rejected both. 21
Instead, focusing on the
accomplice's relationship to the resultant social harm of the criminal
conduct, he posited three potential candidates to replace the current
confused and conflicting theories. Each has obvious relevance not
only to the general topic of accomplice liability but also to the focus of
this article: the justification, if any, for the natural and probable
consequences rule.
First, Dressler suggested that accomplice liability might be
based on one's substantial participation in the venture. Like the
current theories, that theory also shares their deficiencies. Most
notably, a substantial participation test would likely look to the time
and effort someone expended on the criminal venture, rather than the
efficacy of his efforts in producing the resultant harm. Thus, this
theory would likely emphasize the accomplice's relationship to the
criminal enterprise, at the expense of examining his role in causing the
crime. That is inadequate, as the focus is misplaced, taking too great a
note of the company the accomplice has kept and too little of what she
did as a criminal actor.
Next, Dressler examined the "control or hegemony test,"
noting its similarity to the European views. 22 By that view, only those
who control or assert hegemony over the other criminal actors should
be treated as perpetrators and be subjected to the full punishment of
the law. However, though that approach may work for some
offenders, it could easily result in treating others too leniently. To
demonstrate that possibility, Dressler again appeals to our intuitions.23
Suppose, for example, that a group is planning a bank robbery
and the "brains" behind the scheme has sought out a master electrician
to disable the alarm system. Suppose further that the electrician did so
successfully, the robbery was a success, and she had no other
See Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical underpinningsofAccomplice
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGs L.J. 91 (1985-86).
21 Id at 121 and following. The agency view simply reflected the view that the
accomplice has authorized the perpetrator to act on her behalf and should accept the
consequences of that accordingly. The moral forfeiture view was based on the fact
that the accomplice had forfeited her personal identity by throwing in with others and
was forced to accept the results. Id. at 115.
22 Id at
124.
20

23

Id
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relationship to that criminal venture, except for sharing in the spoils.
Since she asserted no control over the venture, her level of
involvement would dictate a lesser punishment under the hegemony
test. Yet, under a sensible test, "the person willing to use special skills
to commit crimes is especially suitable for punishment." 24 Thus
Dressler rejected this control test because it provided an incomplete
theory on which accomplice liability would rest. I agree.
Finally, Dressler considered a causation test, under which he
divided accomplices into "causal accomplices" and "noncausal
accomplices." 25 Here he had to prove the legitimacy of this test in the
face of fundamental opposition from Sanford Kadish, who had argued
that causation is effectively nonexistent in accomplice law. As Kadish
said, "[W]hen we seek to determine the responsibility of one person
for the volitional actions of another, the concept of cause is not
available to determine the answer." 2 6
Yet, I believe Dressler successfully demonstrated that the issue,
rather than being a moral one, was instead about burden of proof. The
debate shifts then to how to structure evidentiary burdens to surmount
that issue and introduce the appropriate bases for accomplice liability
into criminal trials. The critical point, though, is that focusing on
causation predicates guilt (and punishment) on the harm one actually
causes, rather than on the harm caused by others. 27 In doing that,
causation fortifies the notion that guilt is indeed personal. It also
fortifies the notion that the basis for criminal guilt lies not in notions
from the civil law of agency but remains firmly rooted in fundamental
criminal notions of culpability and blameworthiness.
C. Natural and Probable? Probably Neither
Superficially, the natural and probable consequences doctrine seems
consistent with the "causal accomplices" and "noncausal accomplices"
model, as it predicates guilt on the causal connection between the
target offense and crimes that follow. However, in reality, the doctrine
utterly departs from the causation model or any other model.2 8 Rather
[d
Id. The latter group would receive lesser punishment.
Sanford Kadish, Complicity, Cause, and Blame: A Study in the Interpretationof
Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 323, 335 (1985).
27 See Dressler,supra note 20, at 125-26.
2 Fletcher is probably right that this reveals an ambivalence about whether
accountability is thus driven more by notions of wrongdoing or by civil notions from
24

25
26

HeinOnline -- 15 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 394 2010

2010] THE A4TURAL AND PROBABLE COvSEQUENCESDocTRLv

395

than focusing on the causal contributions of the accomplice to the
crime, the doctrine simply requires a weak nexus between the crimes
themselves for liability to attach. Moreover, little is required to
achieve a conviction on this basis or on its more specific "common
design" version. Any perception that the subsequent crime was a
foreseeable consequence of the first, no matter how indistinct, has
virtually always sufficed.
This model violates any theory of criminal wrongdoing and
responsibility. Liability based on foreseeability of crimes strains such
theory to the breaking point, as it dispenses not only with the
requirement of intent but also seemingly with mens rea entirely.
Worse, it also dispenses with the requirement of any personal act of
any kind, predicating liability solely on one's status as an accomplice
to the first offense. Finally, it virtually eliminates the need for the very
causation of which it seems so enamored.
The Model Penal Code rejects this natural and probable
doctrine, as do most commentators. The commentary to the Code
labels the position "incongruous and unjust." 29 Other commentators
criticize its inversion of the usual culpability requirements. Dressler,
for example, points out that this doctrine permits conviction based on
negligence, though the target offense may well call for a higher mental
state. 30 He would be right if the doctrine truly required proof of
negligence and a jury instruction on that. However, as I have
indicated, the so-called doctrine in practice degenerates into a kind of
causation-based requirement, with no proof of causation required.
Despite such issues, as Dressler also points out, at common law
and in most jurisdictions an accomplice to the target offense is also
liable for the "natural and probable consequences of the crime aided
and abetted."3 1 In Illinois, the term used for this is "common design."
Apparently reaching back to 1854, the common design rule had been
applied by Illinois courts until the re-codification of criminal law in
the law of agency, as I have previously discussed. As Fletcher said, whereas the
language we often use "indicates that we regard persons who commit crimes as
autonomous and hegemonous over their acts ... our doctrines of vicarious liability
and liability beyond the scope of the agreement suggest that sometimes we regard the
actor-behind-the-scenes as the dominant figure." FLETCHER, supra note 11, at 664.
29 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 312 n.42 (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
3

See DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 484; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF

CRIMINAL
3

LAW 551 (2d ed. 2010).

DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 483 (citation omitted).
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1961.32 Then, two years prior to the official publication of the Model
Penal Code, Illinois adopted many sections of the Code as they then
appeared, including its provision on accountability. 33
Courts, and indeed all players in the criminal justice system,
would be expected to adapt haltingly to such new, substantially
changed approaches to liability, with the usual stumbles to be
anticipated. What was not as easily predicted, however, was the
apparent hostility with which these provisions would be received.
While courts are typically reluctant to embrace new policies, many
were unusually virulent in their reaction to these changes.
II. NATURAL AND PROBABLE: COURTS AND CODE LAW
American law reveals an uneasy relationship between courts
and legislatures. Legal Process advocates have long touted the clear
advantage legislatures maintain over courts in the formulation of
policy. 34 Indeed, criminal law, with its enormous policy challenges,
obviously benefits from legislative oversight.
Legislatures are
equipped to formulate policy in that reasoned, deliberative mode
championed by legal scholars Hart and Sacks. However, courts have
often responded with a marked aversion to legislation, treating those
efforts as unwelcome incursions into the lawmaking process.
In learned circles, debate has raged over the formal superiority
of legislation to judicial lawmaking. Law professors and legislation
experts William Eskridge and Philip Frickey noted this, commenting
that so-called "legisprudes"' considered "statutes functionally inferior
to judicial decision, which were treated as the primary source of legal
reasoning and policy guidance." 35 Despite these tussles, scholars have
finally declared ours an age of statutes, proclaiming, "[T]he classical
32 James R. Thompson et al., The Illinois Criminal Code of2009: ProvidingClarity
in the Law, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 815, 824 (2008).

A person is accountable for the conduct of another if "either before or during the
commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that
commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid that other person
in the planning or commission of the offense." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2
(West 1993).
See generally HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William Eskridge, Jr. &
3

Philip Frickey eds., 1994).
3 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH

GARRET, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 587

(4th ed. 2007).
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vision of the formal primacy but functional inferiority of statutes has
become outmoded in the past century, the 'age of statutes."" 36 Though
one would hope that change in vision would gain convincing sway
where it matters most-with courts-this has certainly not been the
case with common design.
Illinois courts have consistently resisted the new Code from its
inception. The victorious battles waged in erudite circles remain
hollow victories for the victims of judicial overreaching. Nowhere is
that more evident than in one of the earliest cases decided after the
Code's enactment.
Rudy Kessler was quite literally in the wrong place at the
wrong time-with the wrong people. While he was carousing with
two acquaintances, one mentioned that he had to "put his hands on
$1goo." 3 Kessler mentioned that he had worked at a bar in Rockford,
Illinois, but that the receipts never reached that level. 38 Nevertheless,
the three then proceeded to the bar, and after closing, while Kessler sat
in the car, the other two entered the bar unarmed.
A scuffle ensued in the bar between the two men and the
owner, during which one co-defendant found a pistol in the bar and
shot the owner in the neck. After they fled to the car and raced away,
the other co-defendant shot toward the police several times with the
seized pistol before the police forced the car off the road. The two codefendants fled the car while Kessler remained, initially claiming to
have been a hitchhiker. The three were eventually convicted of
burglary and two counts of attempted murder. 39
In the inevitable appeal, the appellate court rather grudgingly
conceded the correctness of Kessler's statutory argument. To the
court, "imputed or implied intent [was] clearly outside the
contemplation of the statute on accountability." 40 Yet the court then
discussed, almost wistfully, the natural and probable rule in other
states, noting that it represented a "more reasonable approach to the
law of accountability but one which [the court could not] adopt in
contravention of the language in the Code." 41 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court did not feel similarly constrained.
6

[d. at 588.
People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 30 (111. 1974).
Id. See the appellate opinion for that detail, 296 N.E.2d 631, 633 (Ill. App. Ct.
1973).
39 315 N.E.2d 29.
40 296 N.E.2d at 636.
41 Id. at 636 n.3.
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The Supreme Court, while ostensibly following the Illinois
Code, virtually ignored it. Indeed, the State's arguments even revealed
a powerful common law bias. Rather than arguing the plain meaning
of the Code, the State maintained that the appellate court had
"disregarded the plain meaning of legal doctrines applied by this court
and by the highest courts of other jurisdictions."4 2 Of course, one such
legal doctrine was that of natural and probable consequences. The
couWs ensuing stare nostalgia, covering such matters as the misdeeds
of nineteenth-century watermelon thieves, missed no opportunity to
exalt common law over the recently enacted Code. 43 That approach,
and its obsession with ancient doctrine over current statutes, vividly
revealed a profound judicial bias.
Poor Rudy Kessler. Convicted on two counts of attempted
murder, he had been sentenced to five to fifteen years on each count. 44
He now saw his appellate court reprieve unravel in the state's highest
court.
The court next resisted the argument that common design had
not survived the passage of the Code, even though the Code and its
comments had explicitly laid it to rest. In support of this doctrine, the
court cited to cases on felony murder.45 Naturally, felony murder
provides its built-in principle of liability, not relying on separate
notions of common design. However, this litigation further reenforced common design, now rather sadly becoming a case simply
cited in support of the doctrine's viability as settled law.
But Kessler was decided during the early years of the Illinois
Code. Moreover, judges are no better trained than anyone else in the
interpretation of statutes. One would also expect that the common law
bias was stronger in 1974 than it is today. That is not the case.
For instance, the Illinois Supreme Court most recently
addressed common design in the context of sentence enhancement.
Jorge Rodriguez was an accomplice to a murder committed by the use
of a firearm.46 He was not the shooter, and he did not possess-or
possibly even know of-the firearm. Under an Illinois statute, if firstdegree murder was committed while one was armed with a fireann, an
additional fifteen-year penalty had to be imposed by the court.
42315 N.E.2d at 32.
3

41

Id.
See 296 N.E.2d at 633.

45

315 N.E.2d at 33.

46

People v. Rodriguez, 891 N.E.2d 854 (Ill. 2008).
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Obviously, the provision on sentence enhancement existed both to
deter people from carrying guns and to punish those who were armed
with firearms during the commission of murder.47 In principle, the
blanket application of this provision to an unarmed accomplice would,
then, be unwarranted, as the provision is aimed at the individual who
was the actual perpetrator and also actually possessed the weapon.
Indeed, deterrence, here through the vehicle of the sentence
enhancement provision, works that way. But common design seems
particularly inappropriate in this setting, as it has at most an attenuated
relationship to deterrence. However, the court disagreed.
By this point, stare decisis had become particularly potent
when applied to statutory interpretation.48 First, for several decades,
the term "conduct," as used in the criminal code, had been interpreted
by this court to include all conduct, not just that of the target offense. 49
The court has subscribed to this erroneous interpretation of the Illinois
accountability statute for nearly four decades. Second, common
design itself creates this open-ended liability, and the court declared,
"[O]ur accountability statute does not deviate from the common law
rule of common design."5 0 Thus, citation to case law obviates the
need for analysis, as this is now settled doctrine. And, it is extended to
an ill-suited situation, one in which the individual is the target of the
sentencing statute, and that would certainly exclude an unwitting
accomplice.
Now, it would be unworthy to simply heap criticism on this
court. Like many courts before and after it throughout this country,
the Illinois Supreme Court simply perpetuated a common law position
in the face of its inconsistent code. Indeed, though code law has not
always been violated, that may be because some states have clung to
this misguided doctrine too strongly to even permit code reform.
The statute spoke in terms of being "armed," not in necessarily using the firearm to
kill. Unified Code of Corrections, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-l(d)(i) (West
1993). Other subsections of this scheme increased the sentence enhancement to
twenty or twenty-five years based on whether the individual "personally discharged"
a firearm or "personally discharged" it causing great bodily harm or death. § 5/5-81(d)(iii).
4 See generally William Eskridge, Jr., OverrulingStatutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J.
1361 (1988) (particularly interesting piece on the strength of statutory precedents).
49 Under both the Illinois Code and Model Penal Code, someone is liable for the
"conduct" of another if he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission
47

of the offense. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.06(3).

Rodriguez, 891 N.E.2d at 856 (citing again to felony murder cases as well as
nineteenth century case law).
5o
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Illinois is, then, not a rogue state, but it represents a perceptible trend
in favor of holding people liable, despite their meager contributions to
criminal enterprises.
California, for example, applies this natural and probable
consequences doctrine very broadly.
Not limiting liability to
subsequent crimes that resemble the target offense, the state has
extended liability to some matters on the most threadbare of theories.
Thus, in People v. Nguyen, 5 1 up to nine men were involved in the
robbery of two businesses in Sacramento, a tanning salon and a
relaxation spa.52 During these robberies, some of the men committed
sex offenses, and their accomplices were convicted of those offenses.
The California statute includes as principals all those persons
"'concerned in the commission of a crime," regardless of the level of
participation.5 3 Extending that liability to collateral crimes, California
takes the view that one's liability is not governed by any fixed
standard. Indeed, liability is "neither legally abstract nor personally
subjective. It is case specific .

. .

.

A troubling formulation, this

permits ad hoc decision making.
In Nguyen, the court noted that in "hostage-type robberies in
isolated locations, sexual abuse of victims is all too common."5 This,
in conjunction with the "sexual aura" of the businesses robbed, led the
court to easily affirm the convictions for the sex offenses.5 6 Many
similar cases fill the reporters of California as well as most other
states, and the doctrine holds substantial sway in this country.5 7
Indeed, at times this doctrine is even applied or referred to
when contrary to state statutes or governing decisional law.5 8
Apparently, courts in Georgia, Louisiana, Ohio, and Texas apply it
despite its obvious inconsistency with other provisions of state law.59
Unfortunately, to that list, I may unhappily add the State of Illinois.

5'
52

26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323 (Ct. App. 1993).

Id. at 327-28.
SCAL., PENAL CODE

§ 31 (West 2009).

26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334.
Id at 332.
1 Id at 332.
5 Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 184 (2007) (stating that relatively few
jurisdictions have espressly rejected the natural and probable consequences
doctrine).
58 Brief for the Respondent at 17, Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 184
(2007) (No. 05-1629).
5 Id
54
5
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These are the kind of misguided efforts of which Robinson
and others have spoken. But as this is a legal process I am discussing,
others play a role in trying to get things right. These include
legislatures, academics, and people who serve on law reform
commissions. Before turning to those efforts, it would be useful to
show why the Illinois courts and others embracing this doctrine are so
wrong on both law and policy.
II. WHY IS COMMON DESIGN SUCH A BAD IDEA, ANYWAY?
Common design violates the basic Model Penal Code
requirement that guilt rests on a notion of blameworthiness requiring
intentional wrongdoing. It would seem to be justly criticized, then, as
it founders on this key Code requirement for guilt. Naturally, its
defenders would shrug off this criticism on policy grounds, though
they could not overcome the statutory argument that it cannot co-exist
with other Code provisions. But that statutory incongruity runs even
deeper.
A code represents policy choices made through mechanisms of
representational government. Having adopted the Model Penal Code
position, the Illinois legislature concluded that a party's guilt for
another's conduct is based on her intentional participation in that
conduct. Common design signals a radical departure from that
position, in that liability for subsequent crimes has no such
requirement. This is a dramatic break with legal orthodoxy, one
occurring outside the legislative process.
Even more chilling is common design's wholesale rejection of
the role of mens rea in guilt. Like the Model Penal Code, Illinois
scrupulously requires personal culpability for all offenses except those
involving absolute liability and expresses a strong bias against that
notion. It does this through two enormously important sections.
First, the provision on "absolute liability" limits such offenses
to those not involving incarceration or serious fines, unless the offense
"clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for
the conduct described." 60 Common design utterly undermines this as
to all possible subsequent offenses. Through it, the accomplice is
treated much more harshly than the principal wrongdoer; she is
absolutely liable for these subsequent offenses regardless of the
requirements for guilt they ordinarily bear. Thus, whereas the State
60

720

ILL . COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-9

(West 1993).
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had to prove that Kessler's co-defendants had the intent to kill the bar
owner and state trooper, it had no such burden for Kessler. That is
quite mad.
Moreover, it turns all predicates for guilt entirely on their
heads. The principal offender is more intimately connected to the
wrongdoing and is arguably the graver offender than the accomplice.6 1
Yet she enjoys a presumption of innocence not shared by the
accomplice. The accomplice is convictable by the metaphorical device
of common design; regardless of whether any such design (or
agreement) has been proved, so long as crimes one and two seem
related, the accomplice is automatically convicted.
But again, common design apologists will insist that one
should be judged by the company one keeps. Whether that should be
the case, it flatly violates the mens rea provisions of both codes under
discussion.
Like the Model Penal Code, the Illinois Code provides for the
interpretation of statutes that are silent on mens rea. Accordingly, if
the statute in question provides no mental state as to an element of an
offense, guilt may be proven based on intent, knowledge, or
recklessness. 62 This requirement prohibits the application of common
design.
If Dressler and others are right,63 common design allows the
conviction of an accomplice based on nothing more than negligence.
In fact, I believe it requires no mental state at all. It is senseless to
have an open-ended basis for accomplice liability, one in which the
accomplice is exposed to conviction for all manner of offenses, based
on negligence. Worse, such a doctrine is statutorily barred. By the
terms of the Illinois Code, the prosecution must prove at the very least
that the accomplice acted recklessly as to the subsequent offense.
Thus, as it stands, this doctrine completely subverts the Code, and thus
cannot survive its enactment. Sadly, in practice, it has.
IV. UPDATING STATUTES: THE ROLE OF LAW COMMISSIONS
Courts must not ignore statutes that change the common law,
as that clearly violates the separation of governmental powers. That is
61 See

materials, supra, on Fletcher and the nuanced approach by German-influenced

codes.
6§ 5/4-3.
6 See DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 484.
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what has happened with common design. However, at some point, not
only must courts bow to the superior role of legislatures in law
creation, but legislatures themselves must consider whether their work
is still viable and functional.
Guido Calabresi recognized this dynamic, commenting that
statutes sometimes, "like all laws, became middle-aged." 64 We rarely
consider statutes time bound, and they cannot remain vital
indefinitely. 6 5 As times change, and as legal needs change, codes must
be updated. Unfortunately, as Calabresi also notes, "[G]etting a statute
enacted is much easier than getting it revised." 66
The Illinois Code section on accountability was not necessarily
showing any undue wear, sagging, or unsightly wrinkles. However,
the Code had swollen from its original 72 pages to over 1,200. With
the incremental changes and tweaking that take place over four
decades alone, a Code will suffer from inconsistencies and many other
types of problems requiring correction. The need for comprehensive
review was clear.
Accordingly, in 2000, then-Governor George Ryan issued an
executive order creating the Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and
Reform Commission ("CCRRC").
Governor Ryan appointed more
than thirty members to the commission including Professor Paul
Robinson, who agreed to act as the Commission's Reporter. 68 As
Robinson wrote, "[T]he time was ripe to take a step back and conduct
a panoramic review of the Illinois Criminal Code." 69 Unguided by any
national initiative such as a "Model Penal Code Second," Illinois acted
courageously in undertaking this move alone.

64 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 6
(1982).

Indeed, Alex Aleinikoff created the lively metaphors of the archeological search
for meaning as opposed to the nautical one, one recognizing that statutes, much in
the vein of Dworkin's chain novel, are christened and set sail to many ports over
time. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH. L. REV.
20, 21 (1988).
6 CALABRESI, supra note 64, at 6.
6 Exec. Order No. 9 (2000) (creating the Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform
Commission).
68 Wayne R. LaFave and Andrew Leipold accepted appointments as special
counsel.
Interestingly, Paul J. Pomeranke, an English professor served as a "plain English"
drafting consultant.
69 ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE REWRITE AND REFORM COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, at
v (2003), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id 1523384
[hereinafter REPORT].
65
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Robinson was particularly concerned with culpability language
because of the obvious centrality of that requirement. Especially
troubling was the courts' occasional neglect of the Code's disapproval
of absolute liability and requirement that culpability exist for each
element of an offense unless absolute liability was clearly intended.0
Indeed, Robinson explicitly focused on common design as a prime
example of such misguided neglect, recommending the "elimination of
the 'common design' rule for complicity liability."7 1 Noting many of
the problems mentioned here, Robinson's comments provided a
legislative history clearly rejecting common design.
Not content to leave it there, however, the CCRRC sought to
improve on the Model Penal Code, explicitly establishing the
culpability requirements for accomplices. The final draft established
complicity when: "Having the culpability required by the offense, he
intentionally aids, solicits, or conspires with such other person in the
planning of commission of the offense." 7 2
Robinson inserted his commentary within many provisions of
the proposed code, including the section on accountability.
Apparently, a split remained within the CCRRC, with several
dissenting members wanting to retain common design.
The
accompanying comments reveal the rift within the commission
membership:
Issue: Should the Proposed Code incorporate the common-law
"common-design" rule, which imposes complicity liability for all
crimes in furtherance of a common criminal design or agreement
on all parties to the agreement, whether or not they foresaw,
knew about, or ratified those crimes?
Yes: The common-design rule makes it easier to convict an
offender's confederates without a complex and difficult
evidentiary showing of culpability.
No: The common-design rule inappropriately allows for liability
based on negligence, or even in the absence of culpability as to
the offense. The original 1961 Code sought to eliminate the
common-design rule, which was then resurrected in case law. To
the extent such a complicity rule is considered necessary or
desirable in the homicide context, it can be addressed directly
7
71

72

Id at liv.
Id at Ivi-lviii.
Id § 301(I)(b), at 19.
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through a felony-murder rule.
Reporter: Strongly recommends against expanding liability
beyond the current complicity provision. 7
Robinson's language reveals how strongly he felt; in his view
and mine, nothing justifies common design, other than the desire to
convict easily. As I have said repeatedly, that justification violates the
most basic notions of culpability embraced by the Code.
On January 1, 2003, CCRRC chair Matthew Bettenhausen
submitted the final report to Governor Ryan. 74 Consisting of 626
pages, it dramatically rewrote substantive criminal law without
vaulting its own policy notions over those of the predecessor law. 7 5
The Commission's work spanned more than two years, consuming
vast amounts of time and representing literally thousands of hours of
work by Robinson. Governor Ryan accepted the report, thanking the
Commission for a work that "addresses the many significant changes
in our society over the last forty years and ensures that the laws of
Illinois will provide a cohesive and fair approach to crime and
punishment in the years to come." 7 6
At that point, Calabresi's skepticism would seem laid to rest.
Not only had a middle-aged statute been substantially revised, but it
was a criminal code, something that we might think would prove most
politically resistant to change. Moreover, it had received the blessing
of the state's chief executive. But that does not capture the complete
dynamic at work in this attempt at law reform.
Even after it was finished, some members of the Commission
were unhappy with the scope of the reforms. The adopted drafting
process represented a distinct compromise within CCRRC. Some
members wanted essentially a new code, 7 whereas others wanted to
adopt a more "redline" position. 7 The compromise yielded a more
limited rewrite. However, apparently that still left some members
7, Id.

See id. at vii (letter from Matthew Bettenhausen to George Ryan dated January 1,
2003).
Though the report was voluminous, it substantially shortened the Code itself.
74

6

REPORT, supra note 69, at vii.

n Vice Chairman Bensinger wanted to present "a new Code, drawing on the case law
and legislative intent of the existing Code but not necessarily following the same
exact format or language." Letter from Peter Bensinger to Matthew Bettenhausen,
Chairman, CCRRC (Nov. 8, 2000) (on file with Commission staff).
7 REPORT, supra note 69, at xiv.
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dissatisfied. Commissioner and DuPage County State's Attorney
Joseph Birkett resisted any major rewrite, instead favoring "an
examination of current laws and suggesting appropriate changes in the
arrangement of the Code so it is simplified."7 9
Further complicating matters, Governor Ryan announced in
August 2001 that he would not seek reelection in 2002. Thus, the
Commission felt it necessary to complete the drafting process prior to
January 2003, when Governor Ryan's term would expire. Thus, we
have the letter exchange between the CCRRC chair and the governor
dated January 1, 2003. That confluence of events doomed the
CCRRC. Governor Ryan was indicted and eventually convicted of
racketeering, fraud, and extortion. The scandal limited his ability to
advance criminal law reform. Worse, those within the Commission
who objected to the project's conclusions apparently blocked whatever
momentum the project carried.
My personal correspondence with Paul Robinson verifies
81
this.
Robinson watched disheartened as Ryan was powerless to
advance the report legislatively and those with different criminal law
philosophies impeded whatever chances the draft had to make it before
the legislature. Indeed, the Commission disbanded, its work never
amounting to more than an interesting publication on SSRN 82
A. One Commission Ends, and Another Takes Its Place
But the tale continues, as did criminal law reform in Illinois.
Apparently spurred by the work of CCRRC, a group interested in law
reform banded together to form a new commission called Criminal
Law Edit, Alignment and Reform (CLEAR). Sharing seemingly
similar objectives with CCRRC, it consisted of judges, prosecutors,
and public defenders, as well as others active in criminal law. It was
co-chaired by former Governor and United States Attorney James R.
Thomson, and its only carryover member from CCRRC was
commissioner Birkett.8 3
Letter from Joseph E. Birkett to Paul H. Robinson (Oct. 24, 2000) (on file with
Commission staff).
s REPORT, supra note 69, at xv.
E-mail correspondence between Michael Heyman and Paul I. Robinson,
commencing May 6, 2010 (on file with author).
REPORT, supra note 69.
83See generally CLEAR Initiative, http://www.clearinitiative.org (last visited July
16, 2010).
79
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Like its predecessor, CLEAR sought to revise this aging code,
seeking to eliminate "redundancies, inconsistencies and confusing
language."84 CLEAR lamented that "a Code that once made clear
distinctions between right and wrong and concisely explained the
penalties for transgression now confounds even experienced layers and
judges."8 5 CLEAR began working in 2005, and it presented its work
to the legislature and governor of the state in several pieces. Its work
included a substantial change to the existing section on accountability,
one completely contrary to that proposed by CCRRC.
The CLEAR Commission published many of its findings in a
law journal. The findings included a rather lengthy commentary,
dealing with its changes to twenty-two articles of the state Code. 6
Many of its changes were quite minor. However, CLEAR proposed a
substantial change to the existing law on accountability. Its revision
codified the Illinois version of natural and probable, common design.
Never referring to the CCRRC report, this group first noted
that common design "has been applied by the Illinois Supreme Court
for over one hundred and fifty years."' Thus, though it conceded the
absence of common design from the 1961 Illinois Code, CLEAR noted
that courts had interpreted that Code as including that view.88 These
comments and others demonstrated no grasp whatsoever of the
relationship between the Code and this common law doctrine. This
was particularly evident in the group's view of the Code's culpability
requirements.
CLEAR justified the codification of this view by asserting that
"the 'common design rule' is used to determine whether a defendant
has the requisite intent" contained in the Code.
That simply cannot
be. By CLEAR's view, common design is an expedient that imputes
the acts of a principal party to any accomplices. Indeed, the
commentary quoted favorably from the language of Kessler: "Where
two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or
agreement, any acts in furtherance thereof committed by one party are
considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design and all
"4 Id

Id
James R. Thompson, Gino DiVito, Peter G. Baroni, Kathy Saltmarsh & Daniel
Mayerfield, The Illinois Criminal Code of2009: ProvidingClarity in the Law, 41 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 815 (2008).
' Id at 823.
95

6

88 Id
89 Id
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are equally responsible for the consequences of such further acts."90
CLEAR's commentary contends that common design provides a
mechanism for determining whether a defendant "is accountable for
another's criminal acts." ' Accordingly, it is very hard to take this
commentary seriously, as it does not even attempt to distinguish
between acts and mental state. Moreover, the commentary supports its
view by providing a rather slovenly paraphrase of Pinkerton v. United
States, which established liability for any crimes committed to advance
the conspiracy so long as the participants are still part of the
conspiracy when committed. 92
Unfortunately, the state legislature did take CLEAR's poorly
reasoned suggestion very seriously. The CLEAR group sent its
revision of the accountability statute to the state legislature, which
adopted the language I just quoted verbatim.
As a result of that legislation, the state Code now contains this
common design nonsense. The common design provision sits side-byside with the previous Code language, which essentially reproduced
the Model Penal Code. 93 Aside from the defects already discussed
here, this new legislation creates two enormous problems. First, the
Code now contains two distinct and incompatible positions on the
basis for accomplice liability. Prosecutors will inevitably rely on
common design to convict those involved in multi-crime enterprises
since it is a much easier standard for them to meet. That will be so,
regardless of the accused's involvement in those subsequent crimes.
That is a complete, and unfortunate, victory for common design.
Second, the content of the Code-the language lifted slavishly
from Kessler-makes no sense, mocking the notion of statutory clarity
and the principle of legality. Providing a virtual study in how not to
draft a Code, the CLEAR group relied on language never intended for
inclusion in a statute. It completely avoided any mention of act or
mental state, undermining a major objective code reform. 94
9o Id. (quoting People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 32 (111. 1974)).
9' Id. at 824.
92 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (failing to distinguish
between
conspiracy and complicity and creating dangerous precedent from analogies drawn
to commercial law).
93 See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-2 (West 1993).
94 "An essential provision of a criminal code is the Principle of Legality, which
requires that penal law should give notice to the citizenry as to what conduct is
proscribed as well as provide an ascertainable standard of guilt to those who have
enforcement responsibilities, such as police, prosecutors, judges and juries." John
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Beyond that, by stating that the acts in furtherance "are
considered to be" the acts of all parties, the commission used language
defying legal recognition. Presumably, this means that the acts of the
principal offenders are imputed to accomplices, though it remains
unclear. In addition, this sub-section provides no mechanism for
determining just when a "common criminal design or agreement"
exists, and thus it provides no guidance for determining the material
elements of the offense that must be proved by the prosecution. Based
on precedent, apparently nothing has to be proved.
Indeed, though common design has now been codified, little
will change legally. Functionally, prosecutors will rely on the doctrine
for charges and convictions more frequently. The doctrine is so
familiar to all participants that few will realize that the State has now
codified a doctrine that conclusivelypresumes guilt.
The state pattern jury instruction already covers this doctrine,
closely tracking the Model Penal Code and providing the conditions
under which an accomplice is accountable for the conduct of another.
This is acceptable. However, the instruction then enshrines this
mistaken interpretation of "conduct" from this skein of common
design cases. According to the instruction, "the word 'conduct'
includes any criminal act done in furtherance of the planned and
intended act." 95 Moreover, the mental state has been proved if it has
been shown that "the defendant shared a criminal intent of the
principal or evidence [exists] that there was a common criminal
design."96 The blow to the principle of legality is clear and complete.
Citizens are placed on notice that they are subject to conviction for
virtually any subsequent offense of a criminal cohort. The message:
be terribly careful about the company you keep.
B. A Possible Escape from this Conclusive Presumption of
Guilt
The common design doctrine has survived all forms of legal
process. It migrated unaltered from ancient state law into the present.
It survived the scrutiny of a law reform commission, indeed receiving
Decker, The Mission (?f the CriminalLaw Edit,Alignment, and Reform Commission
(CLEAR): An IntroductoryCommentary, 41 J. MARSHALL L. RFV. 611, 657-58
(2008). Professor Decker was the Special Advisor to the CLEAR Initiative.
9 Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases,
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Criminal § 5.03 (4th ed. Supp. 2000) 2008-2009.
96 Id The term "common design" is nowhere defined by state
jury instructions.
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its blessing. Then, it achieved code status, having passed through the
state legislature and received the governor's signature. But nowhere in
those travels has it been properly exposed to the light of day.
Mounting a successful challenge to this doctrine may require
the most futile-sounding gesture: a request that a trial court disavow it.
In a properly chosen case, defense counsel representing the "commondesign defendant" must do what defense counsel invariably do, seek a
directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the State's case. The
argument is clear: the State has provided no evidence whatsoever of
the client's participation in the subsequent crime, neither acts nor
mental state.
The prosecutor will parry, claiming that "common design"
obviates the need to prove those elements. The replies to that are
entirely Code-based.
Criminal guilt requires proof of at least
recklessness, where no mental state is included, as is obviously the
case here. Moreover, "a material element of every offense is a
voluntary act."97 Thus, the failure to adduce any evidence of either
should be fatal to the State's case. There cannot be a conclusive
presumption of guilt for subsequent offenses simply based on the
defendant's participation in the target crime.
Inertia would almost certainly cause the court to deny the
motion. It would likely cite to the long presence of common design
within state law and its recent codification after the CLEAR initiative.
But now the issues would be properly framed for an appeal, attracting
the attention of numerous amici. Assuming the issues were narrowly
and precisely framed, success on appeal could well follow. As a
statutory matter, this common design amendment irreconcilably
conflicts with the remainder of the state scheme on accountability and
absolute liability crimes.
However, because of the constitutional dimension to the
argument, even defeat in the state system could be followed by a
federal court victory on the grounds that the Due Process Clause
prohibits a conclusive presumption of guilt. Explaining the operation
of presumptions generally, Professor Wayne LaFave examined their
"slippery" nature but noted that they operate to "call for uniform
treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other facts.' 9 8
Here, the involvement in the target offense serves as the "fact"
9 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-1 (West 1993).
9 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 159 (5th ed. 2010) (quoting C. MCCORMICK,

EVIDENCE § 342 (J. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1999)).
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from which the jury would conclude guilt for the subsequent offense
or offenses. Thus, though common design does not neatly fit within
the concept of a presumption, it operates even more powerfully.
Rather than simply providing an evidentiary mechanism for bridging
the gap from one point to another, it provides an automatic mechanism
for conviction.
This conflicts with the seminal presumption in criminal law,
the innocence of the accused.99 As Dressler said, "[R]ebuttable
mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional when the presumed fact
is an element of the crime charged." 0'o Here, the doctrine operates to
presume both the act and mental state, the cornerstones of culpability.
Thus, common design clearly violates the constitutional mandates
expounded in Sandstrom and its progeny.101 Victory on constitutional
grounds should be a virtual certainty, were that option explored.
In any event, exposing this doctrine to this form of scrutiny and
notoriety might also rouse the legislature to action, this time in a
focused setting.
Admittedly, challenging individual criminal
convictions is not the ideal way to accomplish law reform. But all
other avenues are now well trod and have proven unavailing. So, at
times this form of direct challenge to a law's legitimacy is all that is
left.
C. The Costs of Misguided Law Revision
Sadly, Paul Robinson foresaw
discharged, commenting to me that it
expect from that crowd. It is nothing
predictable does not mean acceptable.
many ways.

this result after his group was
was "exactly what you should
to be surprised about."lo2 But
Bad law is just too costly in so

The presumption conflicts with "the overriding presumption of innocence with
which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime."
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1952).
100DRESSLER, supra note 7. at 80.

101Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). Indeed, as Dressler went on to say,
"True irrebuttable presumptions are hard to find in the criminal law," and they are
"unconstitutional for the same reasons that mandatory rebuttable ones are
impermissible." DRFSSLER, supra note 7, at 81. In common design, we have both.
102 E-mail from Paul H. Robinson to Michael Heyman (May 6, 2010) (on file with
author). Moreover, Paul's bitterness was evident. Having spent thousands of hours
working on the CCRRC project, he saw that go down the drain in favor of something
"much less ambitious, and something more prosecutor friendly." E-mail from Paul
H. Robinson to Michael leyman (May 7, 2010) (on file with author).
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Rudy Kessler was, as mentioned, sentenced on two counts of
attempted murder in which he did not remotely participate. Each
count carried a sentence of five to fifteen years. Had he only been
convicted of burglary, the crime for which he was guilty as an
accomplice, he would have likely served only a couple of years. As it
was, he may have to serve decades based on this monstrous doctrine of
common design. Along with a loss of freedom, Kessler would have
lost whatever else he had: family, friends, and other life pursuits.
Kessler is not alone. This doctrine (and its generic form
nationally, natural and probable) has resulted in untold convictions of
innocent people.1 03 These people are guilty of some criminal
behavior, and they may not be model citizens. However, any sense of
animus felt toward common design defendants should not result in
their conviction for all offenses committed by their confederates. Yet
that may well be the animating sentiment of the CLEAR commission.
Naturally, this does not include the more ineffable, less
measurable costs to civil society from this gross misuse of the criminal
sanction. No one benefits. Its imposition represents a mindless, rather
brutal treatment of an underclass of those who, while they have
violated our norms, do not deserve that level of condemnation.
CONCLUSION
I have written recently about American Exceptionalism, a
concept usually describing our national disdain for international
organizations and transnational nonns. 104 While writing that piece,
however, I wondered whether the more appropriate concept would be
Americans' Exceptionalism. Something in our national ethos, some
strain of thought somehow embedded in our zeitgeist, seems to reject
certain progressive norms in favor of those we perceive as more
have discussed only two cases within state law, as they are illustrative.
However, the doctrine is a staple of state law, resulting in innumerable reported cases
in which defendants filed unsuccessful appeals, such as Kessler's, and obviously
many more in which they have silently gone to prison. Moreover, the codification of
this doctrine may change prosecutorial conduct, resulting in even greater use of this
notion.
104 Michael G. Heyman, The Time has Come for the United States to Ratify the
Convention on the Elimination ofAllForms ofDiscriminationAgainst Women, 9
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 195 (2010). See generally the writings of Judith
Resnik, who has written exhaustively and brilliantly in the area. See, e.g., Judith
Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).
103
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traditional. This may be the explanation for the continued vitality of
the natural and probable doctrine and its substantial acceptance in this
country. This may also explain our national fetish with felony murder,
long after its abandonment in England.10 5
But Judy Resnik has also written of a different and somehow
parallel thrust to this Exceptionalism. She argued for American
Exceptionalism in a "beacon of liberty mode," in which we justly take
pride in our leadership role in human rights.1 06 The ultimate rejection
of this common design doctrine requires the proper invocation of that
notion.
Psychologist and academic Jonathan Haidt may have provided
the missing piece to achieve that objective.
Writing on the
communication gap between the two major political parties, he noted
that when "Democrats try to explain away these positions using pop
psychology they err, they alienate, and they earn the label 'elitist.' But
how can Democrats learn to see-let alone respect-a moral order
they regard as narrow-minded, racist, and dumb?"' 07
Borrowing from the teachings of Emile Durkheim, Haidt
recognized that all societies need a "tending and caring" that requires
recognition of a rich diversity of moral perspectives. By this view, the
dominant Democratic view reflects a pervasive anomie
(normlessness); in elevating the individual over all social structures,
society then lurches about with a kind of moral incompleteness.
Lacking or somewhat dismissing respect for authority and what he
calls an "appreciation of purity and sanctity,"108 that group simply
thinks its counterpart does not get it.
That may explain the kind of sentiment that results in statutes
that seek to protect the public good from those too quick to join
criminal enterprises. The "law and order" sentiment motivating this
thinking is obvious but must be dealt with rather than dismissed as
hopelessly misguided. That dialogue must confront not only the
doctrinal problems discussed here but also the other concerns that
drive these divergent views. And, somehow, this dialogue must result
in a legal change that may appear politically costly to its proponents.
105England

abolished the doctrine in 1957. The Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz.
2,
c. 11, § 1.
106 Resnik, supra note 104, at
1657.
107 Jonathan Haidt, What Makes People Vote Republican?,
EDGE (Sept. 9, 2008),
http://www.edge.org/3rd culture/haidtO8/haidtO8 index.html.
08 Id.
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Skepticism about law revision, then, seems especially
understandable here. The State has long embraced this dangerous
doctrine and has now codified it. Reform, such as it was, has
seemingly run its course. But perhaps the first model proposed by
Paul Robinson can be achieved. Perhaps, spurred by academic
commentary, lawmakers will eventually recognize the unjustness of
this doctrine and eliminate it. I certainly hope so.
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